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The Internal Revenue Code contains a short, peculiar provision
allowing ministers of the gospel to exclude the value of their home from
their gross income if their congregation provides them with a home or
housing allowance to rent or buy a home.1 This provision, 26 U.S.C. § 107,
is known as the parsonage allowance or parsonage exclusion.2 On October
* Theodore F. DiSalvo is an Associate at Hausfeld LLP in Washington, D.C. He is a gradu-
ate of Duke University Law School, J.D. (2018), University of St. Andrews, MLitt (2015), and
Washington College, B.A. (2014). The author expresses his sincerest gratitude to Professors Law-
rence Zelenak and Joan Magat at Duke University Law School for their inspiration, guidance, and
continued support on this project.
1. 26 U.S.C. § 107 (2018). In full, the text is rather short: in the case of a minister of the
gospel, gross income does not include—
(1) the rental value of a home furnished to him as part of his compensation; or
(2) the rental allowance paid to him as part of his compensation, to the extent used by
him to rent or provide a home and to the extent such allowance does not exceed the fair
rental value of the home, including furnishings and appurtenances such as a garage, plus
the cost of utilities.
2. For convenience, I will refer to the broad doctrine of having favorable tax treatment for a
parsonage as the “parsonage exclusion.” The following briefly provides a basic primer on some of
the relevant terms in § 107. The definition of a minister of the gospel can be found in Treasury
Regulation § 1.1402(c)-5(b) (as amended in 1968), stating a minister of the gospel must be a
“duly ordained, commissioned, or licensed minister of a church.” Treasury Regulation
§ 1.1402(c)-5(b)(2) (as amended in 1968) then provides the services performed by a minister in
exercise of the “minister” to include ministration of sacerdotal functions; conduct of religious
worship; and control, conduct, and maintenance of religious organizations (including the religious
boards, societies, and other integral agencies of such organizations), all under the authority of a
religious body constituting a church or denomination. Broadly, to qualify for § 107, an individual
must be a minister and must perform services in the exercise of a church. Originally, the phrase
“minister of the gospel” was not read as broadly as it is currently, but the broad reading would be
89
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6, 2017, United States District Court Judge Barbara Crabb held that half of
the parsonage exemption violates the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.3 This was the second time Judge Crabb invalidated half of the
parsonage exclusion for violating the Constitution.4 The next day,
Christianity Today denounced her decision: “Atheists Again Get Pastors’
Best Benefit Ruled Unconstitutional.”5
In Gaylor, Judge Crabb spends significant portions of her opinion
reviewing the legislative history and development of the parsonage
exemption in the Internal Revenue Code so that she can evaluate the
parties’ constitutional claims.6 Yet, throughout the opinion in Gaylor, the
history of § 107, relied on in part to reach the holding, is incomplete. The
incompleteness of § 107’s history is not unique, as there is an ongoing
debate concerning the origin of the parsonage exclusion within the federal
tax code. In fact, no author has yet given a full account of where it came
from, outside of one common assumption.
The common assumption among authors has been that the parsonage
exemption’s creation was spurred by the development of the convenience of
the employer doctrine, a separate doctrine similar to parsonage exclusion.
This assumption has been described in various academic works on the
constitutionality of the parsonage exemption and has been litigated in the
judicial system.7 In Gaylor, both the plaintiff and the government sparred
extensively in their summary judgment motions on whether the parsonage
exclusion’s origin in the federal tax code was a direct product of the
confirmed in Revenue Ruling 78-301, where the IRS adopted a broad reading of minister of the
gospel to essentially drop the “of the gospel” (see Rev. Rul. 78-301, 1978-1 C.B. 103; see also
Salkov v. Comm’r, 46 T.C. 190 (1966) (holding a Jewish Cantor that was a duly ordained,
commissioned, or licensed minister qualified as a minister of gospel for purpose of the various tax
provisions, including § 107 that included the phrase ministers of the gospel); see also Silverman v.
Comm’r, 57 T.C. 727 (1972) (confirming the broad reading of ministers of the gospel in Salkov).
But see Lawrence v. Comm’r, 50 T.C. 494, 500 (1968) (contending that this definition is not
unlimitedly broad and does not cover someone calling themselves a minister without performing
the duties of the specific faith in question).
3. Gaylor v. Mnuchin, 278 F. Supp. 3d 1081, 1106 (W.D. Wis. 2017).
4. Id. at 1090. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Lew, 983 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1073
(W.D. Wis. 2013) (holding that § 107(2) violates the establishment clause because it provides a
benefit to religious persons and no one else).
5. Jeremy Weber, Atheists Again Get Pastors’ Best Benefit Ruled Unconstitutional,
CHRISTIANITY TODAY (Oct. 7, 2017), http://www.christianitytoday.com/news/2017/october/
atheists-get-clergy-housing-allowance-unconstitutional-ffrf.html.
6. See Gaylor, supra note 3, at 1090–94 (examining the legislative history of § 107(2) from
1954).
7. See Adam Chodorow, The Parsonage Exemption, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 849 (2018)
(detailing the historical arrival of the convenience of the employer doctrine along with the
parsonage exclusion); Matthew W. Foster, The Parsonage Allowance Exclusion: Past, Present,
and Future, 44 VAND. L. REV. 149 (1991); Bryce Langford, Note, The Minister’s Housing
Allowance: Should It Stand, and If Not, Can Its Challengers Show Standing?, 63 KANSAS L. REV.
1129 (2015).
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convenience of the employer doctrine.8 The government’s motion stated,
“The available historical evidence further confirms that the parsonage
allowance is in fact a legislative application of the convenience of the
employer doctrine.”9 Unfortunately for the defendants, Judge Crabb
disagreed with this statement (with respect only to § 107(2)), holding the
government’s attempt to justify § 107(2) as part of the convenience of the
employer doctrine was not a successful argument. Because that doctrine
“bears no relationship to church property tax exemptions, [the] historical
treatment of [the convenience of the employer] exemptions is not
instructive.”10 However, Judge Crabb did not provide an account of where
exactly the parsonage exclusion was developed. The academic literature
also failed to provide an answer—until now.
The origins and doctrinal development of the parsonage exemption
have not been satisfactorily explored before this article. At most, a link to
the convenience of the employer doctrine is often made before moving onto
questions of the parsonage exclusion’s constitutionality. This article details,
in four sections, where the parsonage exclusion came from and how it has
changed over time. Section I examines the history of parsonages and
taxation within the United States before the Revenue Act of 1921, focusing
closely on the two positions states took in their respective property tax
treatments of parsonages. Section II explores the previously untold story of
the codification of the parsonage exclusion into the Revenue Act of 1921 by
one-term Senator Nathaniel Barksdale Dial. Newly uncovered historical
evidence sheds light on the particular circumstances of this codification.
Section III discusses the most significant change to the parsonage exclusion
since its addition to the federal income tax code. Section IV takes up a legal
battle between Pastor Rick Warren and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
that caused Congress to act with incredible speed to head off a pending
constitutional challenge.
I. TAXATION OF PARSONAGES BEFORE 1921
The taxing of parsonages is older than American history, going back at
least a few hundred years prior to the founding of the United States. Until
the turn of the sixteenth century, taxation of Catholic Church property was
dealt with in the framework of canon law, not the laws of the various coun-
tries.11 If a government intended to tax Catholic Church property, such as a
8. See Intervenor-Defendants’ Reply Brief in Support of Their Motion for Summary
Judgment § II, Gaylor, 278 F. Supp. 3d, Section II of the brief for a historical account of the
parsonage exclusion. See also Plaintiffs’ Combined Brief Opposing Summary Judgment in Favor
of the Government and Intervenor-Defendants, id.
9. Intervenor-Defendants’ Reply Brief in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment,
supra note 8, at 7.
10. Gaylor, supra note 3, at 1103.
11. W. Stanford Reid, Clerical Taxation: The Scottish Alternative to Dissolution of the Mon-
asteries, 1530–1560, 34 CATH. HIST. REV. 2, 137 (1948).
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parsonage, that government could only do so in one of two ways: either the
clergy could offer voluntary gifts to the crown, such as in cases of national
emergency, or papal consent could be requested.12 By the turn of the six-
teenth century, taxing parsonages started to become a more significant is-
sue. As religious organizations other than the Catholic Church began to
gain power and influence in Europe, new methods were needed to pay for
parsonages. New religious sects, such as Lutheranism and Anglicanism,
quickly needed to find a way to pay for or provide parsonages for their
clergy. For example, in 1527 Saxony, when the early Lutheran congrega-
tions were struggling to pay for their clergy’s parsonages, Elector Johann
instructed his constituents that the burden of maintaining parsonages should
fall onto the peasantry for the first time.13 Further changes in the financial
treatment of parsonages began when King Henry VIII started giving prefer-
ential treatment to the Anglican Church’s parsonages while penalizing the
Catholic Church’s parsonages in Chapter 13 of the 1529 Act of Parlia-
ment.14 The issue of how to pay for a church’s parsonage in Europe would
follow onto the shores of the American Colonies.
One early example on the question of whether to tax citizens to pay for
a clergy’s parsonage in the American Colonies is found in reference to the
Massachusetts Bay Colony. In 1836, Chief Justice Parsons of Massachu-
setts discussed the topic of parsonages in colonial Massachusetts in the
American Jurist and Law Magazine. Chief Justice Parsons states, “In 1654
a law was made enjoining the inhabitants of towns to provide convenient
habitations for their ministers, by hiring a suitable house, or by allowing the
minister a reasonable sum to provide for himself . . . [a]nd the salary of the
minister was raised by assessments made on the inhabitants by the
selectmen.”15 This account of the Massachusetts Bay Colony’s law on sup-
porting parsonages for their ministers is an early colonial example of taxing
the population to provide a minister with a house or a housing allowance.
Surprisingly, this colonial law neatly parallels the current language of
§ 107, which provides an exclusion for either congregation-provided hous-
ing or a cash allowance.
While the Massachusetts Bay Colony levied a tax to provide parson-
ages, this approach would not be the only view taken by most states years
later.16 After the Civil War, two opposite positions appeared in the common
law: either to provide or not provide a property tax exemption for a parson-
age. Of the seven states successfully surveyed, five states held that they
12. Id.
13. Susan C. Karant-Nunn, Luther’s Pastors: The Reformation in the Ernestine Countryside,
69 TRANSACTIONS AM. PHILO. SOC’Y 8, 33 (1979).
14. 21 Hen. 8 c. 13.
15. Theophilus Parsons, Parsonage Lands in Massachusetts, 15 AM. JURIST & L. MAG. 268,
269 (1836).
16. See Parker v. Redfield, 10 Conn. 490 (1835) (discussing pre-Civil War taxation and
parsonages).
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would not provide a property tax exemption for parsonages, while a minor-
ity of two states would.
The minority position to provide a property tax exclusion to parson-
ages appeared in Virginia and South Carolina after the Civil War. In his
review of the Law of Tax Titles in Virginia, Raleigh Minor, a University of
Virginia law professor, states that “a church parsonage[] is exempt from
taxation.”17 Professor Minor cites Virginia Code § 457 to support this state-
ment. Unfortunately, the exact language of that section has proved inacces-
sible. However, Virginia’s current state code still contains a property tax
exclusion for parsonages. Virginia Code § 58.1-811 provides a property tax
exemption for “the residence of the minister of any such church or religious
body.”18 Further, nineteenth century case law in Virginia recognized a
property tax exemption for parsonages. In Andrews v. Auditor, the Supreme
Court of Appeals of Virginia posed the following illuminating hypothetical:
“Suppose a church or parsonage, is erected on land with the permission of
the owner . . . can the owner of the land be taxed for the value of such
buildings? Certainly not.”19 More support of a Virginia statute operating in
the 1870s is evident when the court stated, “But it is said that churches and
like buildings are exempt from taxation by express statute. So they are.”20
Therefore, Virginia had common law and, very likely, statutory law prohib-
iting the taxation of parsonages that has survived up to today. Yet one state
would go even further in its support of this idea.
South Carolina took the idea of a property tax exemption for parson-
ages one step further by writing it directly into its state constitution. The
South Carolina Constitution of 1895, Article 10, Section 4, states, “[t]here
shall be exempted from taxation . . . all public libraries, churches, parson-
ages, and burying grounds.”21 The clarity of South Carolina’s position as
expressed in their state constitution is remarkable. South Carolina case law
responded to the codification of this exemption by wholeheartedly support-
ing it. In Protestant Episcopal Church of Parish of St. Phillips v. Prioleau,
the Supreme Court of South Carolina held that a parsonage that was not
being used in favor of another parsonage and yet producing rent was still
subject to the exemption in Article 10, Section 4, of the South Carolina
Constitution because it was still a parsonage.22 This holding is extraordi-
nary for two reasons. First, it is clear the Supreme Court of South Carolina
17. RALEIGH C. MINOR, LAW OF TAX TITLES IN VIRGINIA 13 (1898).
18. VA. CODE § 58.1-811 (2017).
19. Andrews v. Auditor, 28 Gratt. 115, 128 (Va. 1877) (emphasis added).
20. Id. (emphasis added). However, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia does not cite a
specific statute for this point but is conceivably pointing to Virginia Code § 457.
21. S.C. CONST. of 1895, art. X, § 4 (1895), http://www.carolana.com/SC/Documents/
South_Carolina_Constitution_1895.pdf (last visited May 1, 2017). This language has not changed
as it is still in the current version of the South Carolina Constitution, but it is now located at art. X,
§ 3(d).
22. 63 S.C. 70 (1902).
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followed the law presented in the state constitution. More importantly, the
Supreme Court of South Carolina endorsed the position that a minister
could have multiple parsonages and possibly receive an exemption for all of
the properties. No other state property tax, nor the federal income tax,
would go that far in granting multiple properties a parsonage property tax
exemption.
With the majority position, five states decided not to give a property
tax exemption for parsonages in their case law. In Robert Desty’s treatise
The American Law of Taxation as in the Courts of Last Resort in the United
States, he unequivocally states, “A parsonage and the land belonging to it
are not exempt from taxation as church property. The realty of religious
corporations is exempt, but not the residence of a priest.”23 Further, “[a]
parsonage is liable to taxation as real estate.”24 Desty cited Minnesota,
Ohio, Rhode Island, and New Jersey as states that do not provide for a tax
exemption.25 However, Desty is incorrect in implying that all states did not
provide a property tax exemption for parsonages, as South Carolina and
Virginia were providing such an exemption.
In Pennsylvania, there is a long line of case law supporting the major-
ity position that parsonages are not subject to a property tax exemption. In
City of Philadelphia v. St. Elizabeth’s Church, the Superior Court of Penn-
sylvania lists a comprehensive line of cases to cite the proposition that a
parsonage or house for a pastor of a church is not exempt from taxation.26
The court in City of Philadelphia cites at least nine different cases support-
ing this holding, with cases dating back as early as 1858.27 Further, the
court develops a doctrine in City of Philadelphia that, when the parsonage
is an annex of the actual church building, the part that is exempt from taxa-
tion (the church itself) is split from the nonexempt part (the parsonage) and
taxed accordingly.28 It is important to note that Pennsylvania exempted
church property from taxation by statute, but made the policy decision to
not include parsonages. For example, Section 1 of Pennsylvania Law 158
explicitly exempted “all churches, meeting-houses, or other regular places
of stated worship, with the grounds thereto annexed.”29 The case law would
continue to hold that parsonages were not included within the meaning of
this statute.30
23. ROBERT DESTY, AMERICAN LAW OF TAXATION: AS DETERMINED IN THE COURTS OF LAST
RESORT IN THE UNITED STATES 112 (1884).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. 45 Pa. Super. 363, 364 (1911).
27. See, e.g., Dauphin Cnty. v. St. Stephen’s Church, 3 Phila. 189 (1858).
28. 45 Pa. Super. at 369.
29. See, e.g., id. at 368.
30. See, e.g., Reform Congregation Oheb Sholom v. Berks Cty. Bd. of Assessment Appeals,
839 A.2d 1217, 1220 (Pa. 2004) (listing cases).
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Minnesota is another state that did not allow for a parsonage property
tax exemption. In St. Peter’s Church of Shakopee v. Board of County Com-
missioners for the County of Scott, the Supreme Court of Minnesota held a
parsonage owned by a church is not exempt from taxation.31 Specifically,
the court cited Subdivision 1, Section 3, Chapter 1, of the Laws of Minne-
sota 1860 (as amended in 1861).32 This holding was confirmed again in In
Re Grace.33 Further examples of states developing the same majority doc-
trine include Ohio,34 Rhode Island,35 and New Jersey.36
II. THE REVENUE ACT OF 1921 AND SENATOR DIAL
As noted above, some have argued that the parsonage exclusion has its
historical roots alongside another doctrine: the convenience of the employer
doctrine.37 However, the parsonage exclusion does not grow out of the con-
venience of the employer doctrine. While the parsonage exclusion may take
some cues from this companion doctrine, the parsonage exclusion’s exis-
tence is thanks to Senator Nathaniel Barksdale Dial of South Carolina.
Briefly, this section will develop the history of the convenience of the em-
ployer doctrine that is mistakenly assumed as the direct source of the par-
sonage exclusion before moving onto the parsonage exclusion’s own unique
birth into the federal tax code.
The convenience of the employer doctrine is currently codified in the
federal tax code as 26 U.S.C. § 119. Broadly speaking, the value of meals
or lodging furnished for the convenience of the employer are excluded from
gross income of an employee.38 A classic example of this doctrine would be
a fisherman working on a fishing vessel for weeks or months at a time. The
employee has no other option than to live on the boat and eat the food
provided. In fact, the development of this doctrine originally developed be-
cause of seamen fishing away from home. In 1919, the Bureau of Internal
Revenue published a decision, stating, “Board and lodging furnished [to]
seamen in addition to their cash compensation is held to be supplied for the
convenience of the employer and the value thereof is not required to be
reported in such employees’ income tax returns.”39
In 1920, the Treasury Department amended its regulations to fully
adopt the doctrine developed in the 1919 decision.40 The amended regula-
31. 12 Minn. 395, 398 (1867).
32. Id.
33. 27 Minn. 503, 505 (1881).
34. See Gerke v. Purcell, 25 Ohio St. 229 (1874).
35. See St. Joseph’s Church v. Assessors of Taxes, 12 R.I. 19 (1878).
36. See Church of the Redeemer v. Axtell, 41 N.J.L. 117 (1879).
37. Intervenor-Defendants’ Reply Brief in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment,
supra note 8.
38. 26 U.S.C. § 119 (2018).
39. O.D. 265, 1 C.B. 71 (1919).
40. T.D. 2992, 2 C.B. 76 (1920).
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tion called for compensation paid other than in cash, such as living quarters
in a camp furnished to “employees for the convenience of the employer, the
ratable value need not be added to the cash compensation of the employee.
. . .”
41
 Here, the Treasury Department fully adopted a broad principle with
respect to the convenience of the employer doctrine by allowing housing to
be excluded as long as the compensation is not in cash. The Treasury De-
partment expanded meal exceptions in 1920, stating that “‘[s]upper money’
paid by an employer to an employee, who voluntarily performs extra labor
for his employer . . . is considered as being paid for the convenience of the
employer and for that reason does not represent taxable income to the em-
ployee.”42 However, this developing doctrine did have limits initially. The
Treasury Department limited the doctrine by stating, “[W]here a person re-
ceives as compensation for services rendered a salary and in addition
thereto living quarters, the value to such person of the quarters furnished
constitutes income subject to tax.”43 This decision marked the limitation of
the convenience of the employer doctrine in contrast to the expansive posi-
tion the parsonage exclusion would receive.
With the creation of this distinction, the Treasury Department drew a
distinction between necessary and unnecessary housing. For example, nec-
essary housing might consist of living on a boat while fishing or in a camp
while logging a forest. But if the employer-provided housing was not a
necessity, the salaried person could not exclude the value of the living
quarters from his gross income. For example, one group that could conceiv-
ably be subject to this distinction is religious ministers. Some ministers
might be provided living quarters as a necessary condition of working in
that congregation, while others might not. As with the defendants in
Gaylor, at least one author believes the creation of the convenience of the
employer doctrine had a direct effect in creating the parsonage exclusion.44
In fact, the author has suggested that the 1920 regulation required the Bu-
reau of Internal Revenue to “delve deeply into a minister’s duties and re-
sponsibilities, entangling the Bureau with the inner workings of religion.”45
This potential entanglement would require the Bureau to judge how
churches conducted their religion, creating First Amendment issues, and
was tactfully avoided a year later with the addition of the parsonage allow-
ance.46 Yet there has not been any conclusive evidence provided that states
that the Bureau was worried about potential constitutional issues. Because
41. Id.
42. O.D. 51, 2 C.B. 90 (1920).
43. T.D. 2992, 2 C.B. 76 (1920).
44. Intervenor-Defendants’ Reply Brief in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment
§ II, Gaylor v. Mnuchin, 278 F. Supp. 3d 1081 (W.D. Wis. 2017) (No. 16-CV-215); see also Peter
J. Reilly, In Defense of Special Tax Treatment for Clergy, FORBES (Sept. 6, 2012, 6:44 AM), http:/
/www.forbes.com/sites/peterjreilly/2012/09/06/in-defense-of-special-tax-treatment-for-clergy.
45. Reilly, supra note 44.
46. Id.
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of the lack of evidence from the Bureau, it appears the connection between
the parsonage exclusion’s development and the convenience of the em-
ployer doctrine lies more in coincidence than causation.
The first mention of the tax treatment of parsonages in the federal tax
code is found in the Treasury Cumulative Bulletin No. 4 of January–June
1921. In the Bulletin, the Treasury Department states: “Where in addition to
the salary paid a clergyman he is permitted to use the parsonage for living
quarters free of charge the fair rental value of the parsonage is considered a
part of his compensation for services rendered and as such should be re-
ported as income.”47
This specific ruling attempted to clarify Section 213(a) of Article 33:
compensation paid other than in cash.48 This ruling is consistent with an
exception within the existing convenience of the employer doctrine. In the
1920 IRS regulation, salaried employees could not exclude the value of the
living quarters provided if it did not fall within the convenience of the em-
ployer doctrine. Then in 1921, the Treasury Department followed the pre-
ceding regulation and applied its general principle to clergymen. This
consistency, however, would be short-lived. In the Revenue Act of 1921,
the Treasury Department reversed its position that it had held only months
prior. The Revenue Act of 1921, § 213(b)(11), states, “The rental value of a
dwelling house and appurtenances thereof furnished to a minister of the
gospel as part of his compensation is exempt from tax,” thus officially codi-
fying the parsonage exclusion into the federal income tax.49
The person responsible for this addition was Senator Nathaniel Barks-
dale Dial, a freshman Democratic senator from South Carolina. Senator
Dial was originally from Laurens, South Carolina, and was a lawyer and
mill owner before his single term as a senator.50 On October 20 (calendar
day, October 27), 1921, Senator Dial submitted a proposal of an amend-
ment to H.R. 8245 (the Revenue Act of 1921) with the stated intent “to
reduce and equalize taxation, to amend and simplify the Revenue Act of
1918, and for other purposes.”51 The amendment proposed adding to H.R.
8245 “the rental value of a dwelling house and appurtenances thereof fur-
nished to a minister of the gospel as part of his compensation.”52 Senator
Dial’s proposal is the first recorded attempt to provide preferential tax treat-
ment for parsonages in the federal tax code.
The parsonage amendment next appeared in the Congressional Record
of the Senate on November 2, 1921. The conversation in the record was so
47. O.D. 862, 4 C.B. 85 (1921) (emphasis added).
48. Id.
49. Revenue Act of 1921 § 213(b)(11) (1921).
50. See generally REBECCA DIAL, TRUE TO HIS COLORS: A STORY OF SOUTH CAROLINA’S
SENATOR NATHANIEL BARKSDALE DIAL (1974).
51. Id.
52. Id.
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brief that it only consisted of eleven lines of text.53 Senator Dial first of-
fered the same amendment that he had already sent to the desk on October
20.54 Senator Penrose, the president pro tempore of the Senate,55 then pro-
ceeded to read the amendment56 and accept the amendment.57 There was no
further floor discussion.
The next morning on November 3, The Washington Post, in a section
titled “Proceedings of Congress and Committees in Brief,” noted that a pro-
posal by Senator Dial of South Carolina was agreed to with no further elab-
oration.58 The New York Times followed suit that same morning, briefly
acknowledging “another amendment adopted was that by Senator Dial.”59
While the Congressional Record and major newspapers lack any de-
tailed discussion on Senator Dial’s amendment, The Watchman and South-
ron, a newspaper from Sumter, South Carolina, wrote a much more
substantive discussion. On November 2, the day when Senator Dial offered
his amendment to the Senate, The Watchman and Southron ran a story titled
“Relief for Preachers” on the front page:
Senator Dial has proposed an amendment to the tax bill which, if
adopted, will relieve ministers of the Gsopel [sic] hereafter from
having to pay an income tax on the parsonages which they now
occupy.
At the present time the rental value of a parsonage is counted as a
part of the minister’s salary and he must return this rental value
when he makes his income tax returns. For instance, if a parson-
age is worth $40 or $50 a month, he must pay on this rental value.
This matter was presented to Senator Dial recently and he at once
saw the injustice of the present law. He took it up with Commis-
sioner Blair, who informed him that nothing could be done, inas-
much as the law now requires that the rental value of the
parsonage be counted in.
Senator Dial then conferred with Senator Penrose of Penn-
sylvania, chairman of the Finance Committee of the Senate, but
decided to offer the amendment himself. He said he considered
the law unjust and unfair and that in many cases the ministers’
salaries were so small that this extra burden should not be placed
53. 61 CONG. REC. 7162 (Nov. 11, 1921).
54. Id.
55. President Pro Tempore, United States Senate, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/histo
ry/common/briefing/President_Pro_Tempore.htm (last visited May 1, 2017) (showing that the
Senate Pro Tempore of the 67th Congress was Republican Albert Cummings of Iowa).
56. 61 CONG. REC. 7162 (Nov. 11, 1921).
57. Biographical Directory Of The United States Congress, United States Senate, http://bio
guide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=P000217 (last visited May 1, 2017) (showing Sen-
ator Boies Penrose was a Republican Senator from Pennsylvania and was the Chairman of the
Senate Finance Committee for the 67th Congress).
58. Proceedings Of Congress And Committees In Brief, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 1921, at 6.
59. Bar Sales Tax Now, Want It For Bonus, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1921, at 8.
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on them. He said that he would do all he could to secure the pas-
sage of this amendment.60
This short newspaper account is the best direct historical evidence of
the process used by Senator Dial. The Watchman and Southron article also
provides the only known evidence of Senator Dial’s motivation for writing
and presenting this amendment to the Senate. While mainly focusing on the
process of this amendment’s proposal, the story presents two facts (which
are assumed valid) not gleaned from the congressional record.61 First, Sena-
tor Dial approached Commissioner Blair and “took it up” with him.62 This
account is striking for a few reasons. Senator Dial apparently went directly
to the newly appointed commissioner of Internal Revenue to discuss the
“injustice” posed by not having tax preferential treatment for parsonages
codified already in the federal income tax. Also, Commissioner Blair struck
down this request by pointing out that the law now required the addition of
the rental value of parsonages into gross income, exactly in line with the
Treasury Department’s 1921 decision published months earlier.
A second striking circumstance gleaned from this article is how Sena-
tor Dial, having failed to persuade Commissioner Blair to take some action,
then approached Senator Penrose to discuss available options. Given that
Senator Dial proposed this amendment on the floor of the Senate, but with
approval of Senator Penrose, one can infer there was some sort of agree-
ment that was reached between Senator Dial and Senator Penrose. Pecu-
liarly, the article says Senator Dial decided to propose the amendment
himself. Did Senator Penrose approve of the idea, but did not want to pro-
pose it himself in the Senate Finance Committee? This might seem slightly
out of the ordinary as Senator Dial had no experience in taxation while
Senator Penrose was the powerful chairman of Senate Finance. This pairing
was odd and while no direct evidence exists of whether a deal was struck
between the two senators, Senator Dial would proceed to offer his
amendment.
60. Relief for Preachers, THE WATCHMAN AND SOUTHRON (Sumter, S.C.), Nov. 2, 1921, at 1.
61. While this newspaper story has not been independently confirmed with other evidence,
such as meeting notes, there is no reason to believe the article is being untruthful on the facts. In
Senator Dial’s collected papers, he and his staff were in constant written communication with
various newspapers. Some of the papers include drafts of newspaper articles, which someone has
marked up with changes. Included with those markups are copies of the actual published version,
which often has the changes suggested by either Senator Dial himself, or someone on his Senate
staff. This all lends support to the notion that Senator Dial and/or his staff had relationships with
various news outlets. Further, there is only one surviving document in his collected papers dated
from 1921 and that document is not relevant here. His papers provide no direct evidence of a
meeting with either Senator Penrose or Commissioner Blair, or with anything to do with his
parsonage amendment.
62. Commissioner David H. Blair was Commissioner of Internal Revenue from 1921 to 1929
and was newly installed when Senator Dial apparently met with him sometime in the summer or
early fall of 1921. See Previous IRS Commissioners (1862–1955), IRS, https://www.irs.gov/news
room/previous-irs-commissioners-1862-1955 (last visited Sept. 3, 2019).
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Further, it is interesting to note that Senator Penrose represented Penn-
sylvania, one of the states that had not allowed for a parsonage property tax
exemption. Senator Penrose may have been aware of his state’s position
against a parsonage property tax exemption, but still allowed Senator Dial
to proceed to propose his amendment. After meeting with Senator Penrose
and having his amendment accepted on the Senate floor, Senator Dial’s
amendment moved to the House. On November 19, the House took up his
amendment. The whole House record consists of a statement of the amend-
ment with the addition of “and the House recedes with an amendment mak-
ing a clerical change.”63 This clerical change appears to be something
minor, such as a typesetting issue. After this brief statement in the House
record, there is no further discussion in either the House of Representatives
or Senate until Senator Dial’s amendment was codified as § 213(b)(11) of
the Revenue Act of 1921.
While there is not much evidence of the process for Senator Dial’s
amendment or his motivation, some inferences can be drawn from the con-
text and circumstances of Senator Dial’s life in concert with the Southron
article.64 First, Senator Dial apparently was not aware of the Treasury De-
partment’s decision not to grant parsonages a tax exclusion earlier in 1921.
He was made aware of it only after it was in effect. One can safely assume
this happened between the publishing of the Treasury Cumulative Bulletin
No. 4 of January–June 1921 and the end of October 1921. At best, this ten-
month window is a rather short period of time for a senator in 1921 to be
made aware of a problem, come up with a legislative solution, set up meet-
ings with Commissioner Blair and the leader of Senate Finance, and then
create an arrangement to have this amendment proposed. Second, it may be
inferred that Senator Dial was unhappy with the Treasury Department’s de-
cision in early 1921, given that the Southron article twice states that Senator
Dial considered this law “unjust.” In fact, this “unjust” feeling must have
motivated Senator Dial to respond with rapid action in a field in which he
had no previous experience.65
One question raised from this set of inferences is who made Senator
Dial aware of the parsonage tax situation? One possible answer is a constit-
63. 61 CONG. REC. 8020 (Nov. 11, 1921).
64. There are two biographies of Senator Dial, including one published by Senator Dial’s
daughter. See DIAL, supra note 50; see also Jerry Slaunwhite, The Public Career of Nathaniel
Barksdale Dial (1978) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of South Carolina). However, neither
of these biographies has any reference to his amendment, parsonages, or even working on taxation
issues in the Senate. It is also not clear from his papers or these two biographies that Senator Dial
was particularly religious for his day. He did attend Chestnut Ridge Baptist Church in Laurens,
South Carolina, growing up, and his descendants are still a part of the congregation today. Chest-
nut Ridge Baptist Church does not have any surviving correspondence between Senator Dial and
the congregation.
65. Senator Dial was not a member of the Senate Finance Committee. See MEMBERSHIP OF
THE COMMITTEE, https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/MembershipbyCongress.pdf
(last visited Sept. 3, 2019).
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uent. This is plausible given that South Carolina had such strong property
tax treatments for parsonages. Not only was South Carolina’s property tax
exclusion within case law; it was directly in the state constitution. This fact
provides ample opportunity for a constituent to either (i) notice that no par-
sonage exclusion was provided in the eight years of having a federal in-
come tax; or (ii) recognize what the Treasury Department had decided in
early 1921 with its decision to not give preferential treatment to parsonages.
One set of constituents that might have played a role is his church congre-
gation at the Chestnut Ridge Baptist Church in Laurens. It is not unreasona-
ble to imagine Senator Dial or a member of his family communicating with
this congregation during trips back to South Carolina or through written
communication while in Washington, D.C. The population of people that
would have been affected by any federal involvement with parsonages is
rather small, including ministers and their family members. Perhaps a min-
ister reached out to Senator Dial directly or to a lawyer who knew that the
state constitution and case law on South Carolina’s tax treatment of parson-
ages contradicted the federal government’s law.
While it is not clear who contacted Senator Dial to apprise him of the
now complicated tax situation, Senator Dial was a lawyer. He must have
recognized the contradictions that were now at least plausibly going to arise
between South Carolina’s treatment of parsonages and the federal govern-
ment’s treatment of the same. Property taxes and income taxes target differ-
ent things; yet the early days of 1921 further complicated the situation for
South Carolina citizens and their parsonages. Regardless of rationale, Sena-
tor Dial was clearly motivated to change the federal tax code, to which he
was successful in a remarkably short period of time. Thus, the full story of
how the parsonage exclusion arose in the federal tax code is not through the
direct outgrowth of the convenience of the employer doctrine. Senator Dial
was made aware of a situation and took it upon himself to change the law.
The story of the parsonage exclusion must include Senator Dial’s
participation.
III. THE PROBLEM OF CASH ALLOWANCES
Since the parsonage amendment’s codification as section 213(b)(11) in
the Revenue Act of 1921, much of the language has not changed. However,
there has been an ongoing evolution concerning the coverage of the parson-
age exclusion. This evolution took place while the convenience of the em-
ployer doctrine also developed doctrinally, culminating in the Internal
Revenue Act of 1954.66 This section will briefly develop the changes in the
66. Between the Revenue Act of 1921 and the Revenue Code of 1954, there were only minor
changes to the location of the statute. The first change to § 213(b)(11) took place when it became
§ 22(b)(6) in the Revenue Act of 1928. This location change of the parsonage exclusion was
purely clerical. Compare Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 213(b)(11), 42 Stat. 227, 239 (codified
at 26 U.S.C. § 954(b)(11) (1925)), and Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 22(b)(8), 45 Stat. 791,
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parsonage exclusion from the Revenue Act of 1921 until 1950, and then
analyze the parallel expansion of the convenience of the employer doctrine
alongside the parsonage exclusion. Although the parsonage exclusion was
not born directly out of the convenience of the employer doctrine, the two
provisions tracked a similar issue.
Between 1921 and 1950, the parsonage exclusion and the broader con-
venience of the employer doctrine started to expand in scope. One problem
would affect both of them: how to deal with cash allowances for housing
rather than on-site provided housing. In 1923, the Treasury Department
stated that § 213(b)(11) of the Revenue Act of 1921 “applies only to cases
where a parsonage is furnished to a minister and not to cases where an
allowance is made to cover the cost of a parsonage.”67 Both doctrines were
challenged in dealing with cash payments, with the convenience of the em-
ployer doctrine taking up the question first. In Jones v. United States, the
United States Court of Claims expanded the convenience of the employer
doctrine to include a cash housing allowance paid to a military officer.68 In
this case, the military officer received cash for housing because there was
no housing available from the army.69 The court drew a parallel between a
ship captain whose living quarters are provided as a necessary part of the
job and a military officer who is told where to live.70 The officer has no
choice in the matter.71 However, this decision did not expand the conve-
nience of the employer doctrine to include cash housing allowances in
every situation. Here, the court limited its decision to military officers when
the military-provided housing ran out of occupancy space, thus forcing the
military to provide a housing allowance.
In contrast to the limiting expansion of the convenience of the em-
ployer doctrine, courts were more supportive of cash payments for parson-
ages. In MacColl v. United States, the District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois held that a minister of the Protestant Episcopal Church
could receive a monthly housing allowance and exclude that from his gross
income under § 22(b)(6) of the Revenue Act of 1928.72 The minister re-
ceived a $100 housing allowance from his congregation that he used to
purchase a dwelling house.73 Here, the minister did not rent a dwelling
house, but instead purchased one himself.74 The court held that the money
798 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 22(b)(6) (1934)), with Revenue Act of 1954, P.L. 83–591 § 107, 68A
Stat. 1, 32 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 107 (1958)).
67. I.T. 1694, 11–1 C.B. 79 (1923).
68. 69 Ct. Cl. 552, 575 (1925).
69. Id. at 554.
70. Id. at 576.
71. Id.
72. 91 F. Supp. 721, 722 (N.D. Ill. 1950).
73. Id.
74. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\16-1\UST107.txt unknown Seq: 15 28-JAN-20 12:02
2019] RELIEF FOR PREACHERS 103
being provided to him was excludable from gross income.75 Unfortunately,
the court did not provide any analysis of the decision other than listing its
findings of fact and conclusions of law.76 What is striking in this decision is
that the holding directly contradicts the Treasury Department’s decision
from 1923, where the Treasury Department explicitly said that an allowance
provided to a minister does not fall within the scope of § 213(b)(11), which
is now codified as § 22(b)(6). Four years later, a mere two months before
the Revenue Act of 1954, the District Court for the Southern District of
Ohio, in Conning v. Busey, held a cash allowance provided to a minister
was excludable under § 22(b)(6).77 In reaching this holding, the court relied
on MacColl v. United States, although it was not binding authority.78 The
court recognized how the federal government did not appeal MacColl and,
following the sound logic of that decision, accepted the position that an
allowance for a minister can be excluded.79 Despite the fact that the holding
was contrary to the Treasury Department’s opinion from 1923, the federal
government noticed the changing winds and did not appeal MacColl.
In the Revenue Code of 1954, the parsonage exclusion takes its two-
part form by adding the cash allowance doctrine to the language of the
statute. The parsonage exclusion was relocated to § 107, where it still re-
sides today.80 The newly divided statute keeps the first section consistent
with the form of the previous version of the parsonage exclusion since
1921. The significant addition takes shape in the second section, which al-
lows a rental allowance to be excluded whether a home is rented or pur-
chased. This addition is consistent with the expanding doctrine to allow
cash allowances found both in MacColl and Conning.
With the addition of cash allowances in 1954, Congress matched pre-
existing case law and aimed to eliminate the perceived discrimination that
some ministers faced when they were provided a larger salary but not a
housing allowance. The House Ways and Means Committee report states,
“[section 107] is unfair to those ministers who are not furnished a parson-
age, but who receive larger salaries (which are taxable) to compensate them
for expenses they incur in supplying their own home.”81 Continuing,
“[y]our committee has removed the discrimination in existing law providing
that the present exclusion is to apply to rental allowances paid to ministers
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. 127 F. Supp. 958 (S.D. Ohio 1954).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. 26 U.S.C. § 107 (2017):
In the case of a minister of the gospel, gross income does not include—(1) the rental
value of a home furnished to him as part of his compensation; or (2) the rental allow-
ance paid to him as part of his compensation, to the extent used by him to rent or
provide a home.
81. REPORT OF H. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS TO ACCOMPANY H.R. 8300, 83D CONG.,
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954 15 (Comm. Print 1954).
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to the extent used by them to rent or provide a home.”82 Months later, the
Senate Finance Committee report echoed the House statement and accepted
the House changes as they were submitted.83
In comparison, the convenience of the employer doctrine also appeared
in the Revenue Code of 1954 in its mostly modern form as § 119. Unlike
the new § 107, where cash allowances were added as allowable, § 119 did
not include the same addition. There is no mention of any sort of allowance
for housing in § 119. Instead, subsection 2 clearly states that, “in the case of
lodging, the employee is required to accept such lodging on the business
premises of his employer as a condition of his employment.”84
This split between the parsonage exclusion and the convenience of the
employer doctrine with respect to cash allowances was further stated in
Revenue Ruling 56-58,85 two years after the Revenue Code of 1954, where
the IRS accepted the case law developed in MacColl, Conning, and a post-
Revenue Act of 1954 case in Williamson v. Commissioner.86 Not only does
the IRS accept the case law’s position in permitting a housing allowance to
be exempt under § 107, but it also notes how the Revenue Code of 1954
does away with the problem of allowances with respect to parsonages.87
Ultimately, the IRS acknowledged this position conflicts with the 1923
Treasury decision and thereby revoked the 1923 position of not allowing for
a housing allowance to be provided for a minister of the gospel.88
IV. PASTOR RICK WARREN VERSUS THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
After the revision to the parsonage exclusion in the Revenue Code of
1954 to allow cash allowances, the only further change to § 107 would take
place in the Clergy Housing Allowance Clarification Act of 2002. The
change inserted “and to the extent such allowance does not exceed the fair
rental value of the home, including furnishings and appurtenances such as a
garage, plus the cost of utilities” before the period at the end of § 107(2).89
This change is the direct result of a high profile legal challenge between
Pastor Rick Warren and the IRS. This section will explore that legal battle,
which culminated in the passing of the Clergy Housing Allowance Clarifi-
cation Act of 2002 by Congress, and will also explore the importance of the
added language to § 107.
82. Id.
83. REPORT OF S. COMM. ON FINANCE TO ACCOMPANY H.R. 8300, 83D CONG., INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE OF 1954 16 (Comm. Print 1954).
84. 26 U.S.C. § 119 (2017).
85. Rev. Rul. 56-58, 1956-1 C.B. 604.
86. 224 F.2d 377 (8th Cir. 1955).
87. Rev. Rul. 56-58, 1956-1 C.B. 604.
88. Id.
89. Clergy Housing Allowance Clarification Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-181, 116 Stat.
583.
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Pastor Rick Warren is the founder and minister of the Baptist Sad-
dleback Valley Community Church, which he founded in his home in
1980.90 In December 1992, Rick Warren purchased a home for $360,000.91
However, the annual fair market rental value of the home was $58,061 in
1993, $58,004 in 1994, and $59,479 in 1995.92 This discrepancy between
the purchase price in 1992 and the fair market rental value of the house
became the central issue in a decade-long dispute that started between Rick
Warren and the IRS, and ended with Congress stepping in to deal with the
completely separate issue of the constitutionality of § 107.
Each year, before the fiscal year, the trustees of the Saddleback Valley
Community Church met to designate the compensation paid to each minis-
ter.93 These amounts were allocated between a salary for the minister and a
housing allowance.94 Between the fiscal years 1993 and 1995, Rick Warren
was not assigned a salary but rather received all his compensation in the
form of a housing allowance.95 The compensation for these three years was
$77,663 for 1993, $86,175 for 1994, and $99,653 for 1995.96 The vast ma-
jority of each year’s sum was used by Rick Warren to provide a house for
his family and pay his mortgage, utilities, furnishings, landscaping, mainte-
nance, real property taxes, and homeowners insurance.97 In 1993, 1994, and
1995, Rick Warren spent more of his housing allowance provided by his
church on this home than its fair market rental value. The question of law
for the courts became whether Rick Warren’s housing allowance compensa-
tion, excludable from gross income under § 107(2), was limited to the
amount used to provide a home, the lesser of that amount, or the fair market
rental value of the home.98
The issue of how to treat the difference between the fair market rental
value of a house and the housing allowance provided a minister of the gos-
pel was first heard by the United States Tax Court in 2000 in Warren v.
Commissioner. First, the court held that Pastor Warren was a minister of the
gospel within the meaning of § 107, thus leaving the issue of how to treat
the difference of the housing allowance and the fair market rental value.99
The IRS contended that the exclusion under § 107(2) may not exceed the
lesser of the amount used to provide a home or the fair market value of the
home, where allowing a greater exclusion would be contrary to the lan-
90. Warren v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. 343, 344 (2000).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 345.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Warren, 114 T.C. at 345.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 344.
99. Id. at 343.
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guage of the statute and the concern for equality in the legislative history in
1954.100
In 1971, the Treasury Department published a revenue ruling stating
that “an ordained minister who purchased his own home and has his church
designate his entire compensation as a rental allowance may exclude from
gross income only an amount equal to the fair rental value of the acquired
home plus the cost of utilities.”101 The Treasury Department supported the
revenue ruling position by looking at the House and Senate committee re-
ports from 1954. From these reports, the Treasury Department concluded
that Congress enacted § 107(2) to eliminate discrimination for certain min-
isters who received a housing allowance.102 In short, allowing a minister to
exclude from gross income more than the fair rental value would run con-
trary to the antidiscrimination intent of Congress in creating § 107(2).103 In
contrast to this, the Tax Court held that the exclusion for a housing allow-
ance for a minister of the gospel was limited to the amount used to provide
a home, not the fair market rental value.104
The Tax Court’s decision was bifurcated. First, the court evaluated the
statutory text argument advanced by the IRS, and second, it evaluated the
unequal treatment theory. For the statutory text argument, the court stated
that neither § 107(2), the regulations thereunder, nor the related legislative
history pointed to a limit of the amount of income that may be excluded to
the fair market rental value of the residence occupied by the minister.105
One argument made by the IRS to advance the statutory language argument
was the title of § 107, “RENTAL VALUE OF PARSONAGES,” showing
that Congress intended to impose a rental value under § 107(2).106 The
court disagreed, pointing out that the heading of a section does not limit the
plain meaning of the text.107 Further, the court believed that by constricting
§ 107(2) to fair market rental value, it would be disregarding the word
“rental.”108 The IRS argued that Pastor Warren’s position, if adopted by the
court, would allow for unequal treatment of ministers who are provided
housing and excluded under § 107(1) versus ministers who receive a rental
allowance that is excluded under § 107(2).109 The IRS also argued that the
legislative history from both the Senate Finance Committee and House
Ways and Means Committee in 1954 pointed to the discrimination of the
ministers who were provided housing allowances but were not allowed to
100. Id. at 346; see supra Part III.
101. Rev. Rul. 71-280, 1971-2 C.B. 92 (emphasis added).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Warren, 114 T.C. at 343.
105. Id. at 346.
106. Id. at 347.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 349.
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exclude that sum before the addition of § 107(2).110 The court disagreed,
contending that, if the court adopted the IRS position, it would lead to dis-
crimination in the form of added compliance burdens on some ministers.111
With this decision not to limit a minister’s housing allowance to the fair
rental value, the IRS appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
The Ninth Circuit first heard oral arguments on the appeal in Decem-
ber of 2001.112 Shortly after oral argument, the court contacted constitu-
tional law scholar and then University of Southern California Law School
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky to brief the court on the constitutionality of
§ 107.113 In a published opinion by a two-to-one vote, the Ninth Circuit
panel agreed to appoint Professor Chemerinsky to serve as amicus curiae
and also have the parties submit supplemental briefs on the following is-
sues: first, does the court have the authority to consider the constitutionality
of § 107(2); second, if yes, should the court exercise that authority; and
third, is § 107(2) constitutional under the Establishment Clause?114 This
was an extraordinary step with the court acting sua sponte on the question
of the constitutionality of § 107(2). In his dissent, Judge Richard C. Tall-
man attacks the court’s action, stating, “I believe it is injudicious to appoint
an amicus curiae to attack the constitutionality of the parsonage income tax
exclusion when no one but the other panel judges improvidently wish to
reach that issue.”115 Further, “[a]t oral argument the parties clearly stated
that they did not raise this issue in the Tax Court; they are not challenging
the constitutionality of the statute in this Court.”116 However, Judge Ste-
phen Reinhardt, in a concurrence, disputes Judge Tallman’s position and
argues that the purpose for the appointment of Professor Chemerinsky is
merely to obtain more information “in order to make a more informed and
reasoned decision about whether to address an issue and, if so, how, the
issue should be resolved.”117 Ultimately, however, Professor Chemerinsky
was not provided the opportunity to present his brief to the court, as Con-
gress stepped in to head off any constitutional challenge to § 107.
On April 10, 2002, Representative Ramstad of Minnesota introduced
H.R. 4156, the Clergy Housing Allowance Clarification Act of 2002.118 On
April 16, Representative Ramstad, Representative Pomeroy of North Da-
kota, and Representative Sam Johnson of Texas addressed the House floor
110. Warren, 114 T.C. at 349.
111. Id. at 350.
112. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Parsonage Exemption Violates the Establishment Clause and
Should Be Declared Unconstitutional, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 707, 707 (2003).
113. Id.
114. Warren v. Comm’r, 282 F.3d 1119, 1120 (9th Cir. 2002).
115. Id. at 1123.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1120.
118. Clergy Housing Allowance Clarification Act of 2002, H.R. 4156, 107th Cong. (2002).
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\16-1\UST107.txt unknown Seq: 20 28-JAN-20 12:02
108 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:1
about this Act.119 Representative Ramstad opened his remarks with a scath-
ing attack on the Ninth Circuit, saying, “Mr. Speaker, in one of the most
obvious cases of judicial overreach in recent memory, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals in San Francisco is posed to inflict a devastating tax in-
crease on America’s clergy.” 120 Continuing, Representative Ramstad ar-
gued, “America’s clergy face a devastating tax increase of $2.3 billion over
the next 5 years.”121 Representative Ramstad followed with an attack on the
Ninth Circuit’s decision to appoint Professor Chemerinsky sua sponte, as he
had already concluded § 107 was unconstitutional.122 In order to rectify this
“judicial overreach,” Representative Ramstad stated that
[t]he legislation on the floor today will stop the attack on the
housing allowance by resolving the underlying issue in the tax
court case. H.R. 4156, the bill before us today, clarifies that the
housing allowance is limited to the fair rental value of the home,
which has been common practice for decades, for 81 years.123
Representative Ramstad clearly recognized there was a threat to § 107
through a constitutional challenge, so he offered legislation to head off the
source of the appeal to the Ninth Circuit incorporating the decision of the
tax court to not follow the IRS’s previous position of limiting a housing
allowance to the fair market rental value. The House then passed this bill by
two-thirds vote on April 16, 2002, referring the bill to the Senate Commit-
tee on Finance.124 With unanimous consent, the committee discharged the
bill to the full Senate.125 On May 2, the Senate passed the bill with unani-
mous consent, and the bill was finally signed by President George W. Bush
on May 20.126
The Clergy Housing Allowance Clarification Act of 2002 codified the
1972 IRS position that rental allowance exclusions may not exceed the fair
rental value of the home (including furnishing and appurtenances) plus the
cost of utilities.127 While Pastor Warren’s position was closed off via the
legislation, he was granted a victory through the effective date chosen for
the legislation. The bill provided that for all years prior to 2002 clergy
could receive a full exclusion for all their housing costs.128 However, start-
ing in 2002, the parsonage exclusion would be limited to the fair rental
119. 148 Cong. Rec. 1299–1301 (2002).
120. Id. (emphasis added).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1300.
124. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX
LEGISLATION ENACTED IN THE 107TH CONGRESS 285 n.294 (Comm. Print 2003).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Chemerinsky, supra note 112, at 708.
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value of the home.129 Therefore, Pastor Warren technically survived the
challenge to his previous actions with his housing allowance, but the IRS’s
position would be the one adopted moving forward.130 Also intriguing is the
projected revenue effect of the bill. For fiscal years 2002 and 2003, this
provision was estimated to increase the federal fiscal year budget by less
than $500,000 annually, only increasing to $6 million annually by 2011 and
2012.131 This minuscule amount of comparative revenue would not usually
warrant such rapid response by the House and Senate, yet it did here.
Having raced to prevent a constitutional challenge, Congress was suc-
cessful in avoiding review of the constitutional challenge being presented to
the Ninth Circuit for review. Two days after being signed by President
Bush, the attorneys for the federal government and Pastor Warren filed a
stipulated dismissal in the Ninth Circuit.132 Though Warren was moot by
Congressional action, Professor Chemerinsky would continue to pursue a
challenge to the constitutionality of § 107 himself, filing a motion to inter-
vene on the day of the stipulated dismissal.133 Professor Chemerinsky
would never get a chance to fully address the constitutional question in
court, so he wrote a law review article on the unconstitutionality of § 107 in
his paper, The Parsonage Exemption Violates the Establishment Clause and
Should Be Declared Unconstitutional.134 Unfortunately for some, the con-
stitutional challenges remain. As seen by both Lew and Gaylor, there is a
continued effort to attack the constitutionality of § 107 in court. How or
when Congress might act again is unknown, as § 107 survived the recent
congressional tax overhaul of 2017 without a word raised in its direction.
V. CONCLUSION
This article traced the history of the § 107 parsonage exclusion from
its earliest historical roots. Starting with early U.S. state property tax rules
present in the common law, one can see the bends and curves of the histori-
cal basis for the current parsonage exclusion found in the federal income
tax. This article showed the addition of the parsonage exclusion into the
federal tax was not developed directly through the commonly assumed con-
venience of the employer doctrine. Rather, the parsonage exclusion would
be codified due to a unique set of circumstances and the will of one man:
Senator Dial. While his motivations can only be explored under some as-
sumptions, the historical evidence of The Watchman and Southron newspa-
per story provides some basis to believe Senator Dial acted swiftly to right a
129. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION EN-
ACTED IN THE 107TH CONGRESS 285.
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perceived wrong. However, the convenience of the employer doctrine and
the parsonage exclusion would each track the issue of cash allowances and
prove that, while they are two separate doctrines, they are close compan-
ions. Overall, this article hopes to have provided a fuller, richer history of
parsonages and taxation than has previously been explored.
